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1. Introduction 
One key social policy question facing most western societies is how best to fund long 
term services and supports (LTSS) in aging populations. About half of adults that reach the age 
of 65 can expect to use some long-term services and supports before they die (Favreault and 
Dey, 2015).  Among those who will use LTSS, the expected present discounted value of the 
services they would use is estimated at $133,700 in 2015 dollars. Roughly 5% of men and 12% 
of women age 65 and over will incur costs for LTSS of more than $250,000 in present 
discounted 2015 dollars before they die (Favreault and Dey, 2015). Private insurance is limited, 
and in the United States it pays for only about 10% of LTSS. Public insurance, and more 
specifically Medicaid, accounts for about 35% of LTSS spending. As a result, about 50% of all 
spending for LTSS is paid for out-of-pocket by service users and their families. Housing assets 
play an important role in such “self-insurance” mechanisms. However, to date evidence of the 
effect of wealth shocks on LTSS use is limited. 
Housing assets have historically been the main source of non-pensionable wealth of 
Americans (Venti and Wise, 1991). This is especially the case for older adults: 72% of older 
Americans are homeowners, and continue to be homeowners at older ages (ASPE, 2016).  The 
median per capita net value (after accounting for debt) of housing assets of older adults is about 
$80,000 in 2015 dollars. That amounts to 67% of the median per capita net worth of adults over 
the age of 65.  Because housing wealth is the largest source of savings that can be used to pay for 
unexpected health shocks that involve LTSS, we seek to understand how a wealth shock affects 
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individual long-term care decisions.  
Given the central role housing plays as a form of precautionary savings one would expect 
changes in household wealth to influence the capacity to self-fund for LTSS. Establishing the 
causal links of wealth to LTSS is complicated by the fact that unobservable factors that drive 
wealth accumulation may also affect the demand for LTSS later in life (Garber, 1989). Indeed, 
most individuals save ‘generically’ for old age, which includes LTSS and other sources of 
expenditure.  
 
Our identification strategy relies on observing changes in patterns of use of LTSS in 
response to housing wealth shocks created by the great recession (2006-2010). Since home 
equity is such a large component of wealth for most households, large unexpected changes in 
housing prices are likely to have an important influence on consumer’s decisions, especially at 
old age when individuals tend to rely heavily on their housing assets. That is, an exogenous 
reduction in wealth at the time it is needed to pay for LTSS can reduce its use. 
  
In this paper, we focus on wealth shocks created by the great recession’s induced 
movements in housing prices in the United States and the impact of LTSS use. The variation in 
housing values begins with the start of the real estate boom that dates to the first quarter of 1998, 
through to the beginning of the housing bubble burst in quarter one of 2006, the bust (or post-
boom) period runs through 2012 (Cohen et al, 2012). That is, housing prices peaked in early 
2006 after a decade of price increases, and at the end of that year there was a sudden, unexpected 
and historic drop in prices of 18.9%. Home prices continued to fall significantly into 2009, after 
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which prices exhibited more moderate reductions until 2012, when prices began to climb again1. 
Changes were heterogeneous across the country: housing prices tended to rise much faster in 
metropolitan areas on the East and West coasts compared to the middle of the nation (Cohen et 
al, 2012)2,3. Thus, there is considerable variation in the magnitude of housing price changes 
across both geography and time. However, although local housing price changes are exogenous 
to individual households, they are in part driven by local economic conditions that may affect 
individual health in ways other than through home equity effects. We account for this by 
incorporating locality and time fixed effects into our econometric model. As a robustness check, 
we estimate the impact of local housing price changes on the use of LTSS by renters who 
experience the same housing market conditions as owners but without experiencing the direct 
wealth gains or losses. 
 
We confirm in our data the effect of a significant wealth expansion from 1994 to 2006. After that 
we find a wealth reduction (in the form of wealth shocks) that is on average a 20-25% drop in net 
value until 2010. The large and for the most part unexpected changes in housing prices are 
posited to have an influence on consumers’ decisions regarding the use of LTSS. The analysis 
shows little response to housing wealth changes in nursing home use while formal home health 
and the intensity of informal care use are positively related to housing wealth.  
 
                                                 
1 See Figure A1 in the Appendix 
2 For example, prices in Boston during the boom increased by 121% and during the bust dropped by 15%, whilst in 
LA they increased by 231% during the boom and dropped by 40% during the burst.  In contrast in Detroit, the price 
changes were more balanced: prices increased during the boom by 46% and then declined by 44% during the bust. 
3 The two main indexes that are regarded as reliable are the Standard & Poor’s (S&P)/Case-Shiller house price index 
and the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) Purchase-Only. However, although variation is larger in the 
former, the two indexes are remarkably similar in the timing of the changes. Overall, metropolitan areas with the 
larger booms tended to have larger busts. 
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The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section contains the background, 
followed by a section describing the data and our empirical strategy; section four reports results 
and a final section contains some concluding observations.  
 
2. Background  
 
Housing wealth is a a major source of savings that is frequently used to finance LTSS for 
older adults. Recent research estimates that the median adult has sufficient housing wealth to 
purchase a little more than one-half year of nursing home care, 208 days (ASPE, 2016).  In 
assessing how changes in housing wealth may affect patterns of using LTSS, it is important to 
understand how and when housing wealth is used by older adults, the role of housing wealth in 
the total net worth of older adults, and the demand for LTSS. We briefly review what is known 
about older adults’ wealth and use of LTSS. 
 
Housing at old ages. One of the most striking trends in US housing markets has been the 
sustained increase in the homeownership rate for those 65 years and older that is attributed to a 
rise in Social Security benefits (Engelhardt, 2008). There is a strong desire among older adults to 
age in place (Venti and Wise,1990), and in turn a correlation between income and 
homeownership for this group. Housing wealth is used to smooth consumption, although 
evidence indicates that this happens primarily at very old age. Walker (2004) shows that housing 
sales by older people in single-person households are mostly driven by poor health rather than 
age. Surging policy attention and research interests have focused on the relationship between 
housing price fluctuations as a proxy for wealth shocks.  
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Housing wealth effects. Housing equity has a very important influence on the income of older 
European (Doling and Elsinga, 2012), and has been found to reduce the amount people save 
(Doling & Horsewood, 2008).Venti and Wise (1991) reported that approximately 80 per cent of 
the wealth of older households in the USA was held in the form of housing equity. Recent data 
from the US Census Bureau (2015) displayed in Figure A2 show that still today, the average 
American over 65 holds about 77-86% of its net worth in the form of housing equity.  
 
 Thus, older adults are often described as being ‘income-poor and housing-rich’ (Hancock, 
1998). Property is generally the last resource liquidated, and the liquidation timing has been 
shown to depend on people’s health.  
 
Changes in wealth have an impact on welfare and consumption at old age (Case et al., 2005 and 
Campbell and Cocco, 2007) although there are some differences between short and long run 
effects. More specifically, Case et al. (2005) find that changes in aggregate housing values 
expand consumption with an elasticity that can be as high as 0.1. However, when long run 
effects are accounted for, the housing wealth elasticity drops to 0.04 but still remains significant 
(Carrol et al., 2006). Some studies find differences between financial and non-financial wealth 
(Bostic et al. ,2009) and other studies distinguish between positive and negative wealth shocks 
(Disney et al., 2020). Finally, one ought to distinguish perfectly anticipated housing price 
changes from unanticipated ones. The effects of the latter are the focus of this paper. 
 
We focus on housing price shocks that are plausibly orthogonal to individual decision making. 
This is in part because home ownership has consumption effects, and individuals do not 
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necessarily perceive its investment nature at every point in time. However, in the event of a 
combined health and wealth shock, then the investment effects might become more salient. Other 
instances when investment effects kick-in include downsizing effects later in life (Campbell and 
Cocco, 2007).  
 
A body of research has used variation in economic circumstances to study choices about long-
term care and the health of older adults (Davidoff, 2010). Using evidence form the Social 
Security notch that would differentially affect the income of retirees, Goda et al. (2011) find that 
a positive permanent income shock reduces the demand for nursing homes and increases demand 
for paid home care services. Poterba et al. (2011) find that net worth rises with age for healthier 
households (those in the top three quintiles of initial health status), but is flat or more slowly 
increasing for less healthy households. The latter finding explains why a preference for sale and 
home reversion later in life to pay for care is mainly determined by health and personal care 
needs (Costa-Font et al., 2010). Finally, one study found that the requirement for people in the 
UK with capital resources to contribute to their care is a significant disincentive to institutional 
admission, whereas institutional use is more common among renters (McCann et al., 2012). 
 
Family Proximity and Informal care. Aging often entails a higher dependence on personal 
support including care from informal caregivers, such as children and their families. Children 
who expect to provide care to their family members might incorporate such a caregiving 
responsibility into their residential choices.  Proximity to family members determines availability 
of informal caregiving, and arguably the economic downturn of 2006-2010 might have improved 
the welfare gain from living close to family members.  However, the effects of distance on 
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contact is less obvious and might depend on an individual’s socioeconomic circumstances 
(Greenwell and Bengtson, 1997)4.  
 
Insofar as an economic downturn might exert an influence on resources, one might expect it to 
impact the decision to live close to an older family member, and to increase the probability of 
informal caregiving. Aquilino (1990) finds that marital status influences adult co-residence with 
parents, and other studies find that the presence of a female sibling in the family explains 
distance to family and adult co-residence (Michelin and Mulder, 2008). Education and number of 
children appear to be the strongest correlates of parent-child proximity (Lin and Rogerson, 
1995). Hence, we need to control for such covariates in modeling long term care use decisions.  
 
Effects on Health and Disability.  A wealth shock also can influence long term care 
decisions by changing the need for long term care. Previous research finds a weak wealth and 
health nexus effect (Meer et al., 2003). However, such an effect is due in part to the fact that 
individuals can adapt their housing to their physical and mental health needs (Heywood, 2004). 
Observing a home owner’s health over the business cycle, and more specifically the recent great 
recession, McInerney et al. (2013) find evidence of a change in health. But the change in health 
is driven mainly by a change in non-housing wealth, which increases the chances of depressive 
symptoms and the use of anti-depressants.  
 
 
 
                                                 
4 Among the potential reasons is the fact that potential caregivers are in the middle of their careers, and most likely 
caregiving duties to parents might coexist with that of children.  Bengtson and Roberts (1991) argue that geographic 
distance is typically adjusted over time on the basis of the both changes in needs and resources of both generations. 
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3. Empirical Implementation 
 
We use the variation in housing prices between 1992 and 2010 as an instrument for 
evaluating the effect of wealth shocks on the use of long term services and supports. In 
particular, we focus on the wealth shock effects at the extensive margin (those using LTSS that 
previously were not) and at the intensive margin (specifically, whether it influences the intensity 
in use of nursing home care). We also document the effect that exogenous changes in housing 
assets exerted on the probability that an individual uses various forms of LTSS. We rely on the 
Health and Retirement Study (HRS) 3-10 waves, and we use time and state specific housing 
price changes to identify the effect of housing assets change on use of LTSS.  Examining 
changes in wealth during the period 1992 to 2010 is of particular importance given the 
considerable heterogeneity on the effects of the housing bubble across the United States.  
Housing price data were obtained from the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA); we could 
match the data to individuals who own a property for a total of 173,480 observations.  Thus, 
the exogenous variation in metropolitan and regional housing prices allows us to exploit 
exogenous variation in home equity wealth based on an individual’s residence.  We have 
estimated reduced forms and tested for the robustness of the instruments. The result indicate that 
wealth is endogenous and housing price variation performs well as an instrument for changes in 
wealth.  We have controlled for individual factors that are likely to impact individuals’ 
caregiving and housing alternatives at older ages. Time specific effects also are an important 
source of variation we control for by including time dummies in our regression estimates. At the 
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same time, we examine the effects of changes in housing prices on renters, who would not 
experience a direct wealth effect.5  
 
Data and Sample. The Health and Retirement Study (HRS) is a publicly available 
longitudinal data set that has been sponsored by the National Institute on Aging. The HRS 
surveys (waves) have been conducted biannually since 1992, and follow respondents who were 
born between 1931-1941 and their spouses. A separate sample, AHEAD,6 was added in 1993; it 
consists of community-dwelling people born before 1924. Subsequent samples have periodically 
been added to maintain a basic sample of people 51 years of age and older.7 Given that long term 
care can potentially affect all those cohorts, we merge the samples. The latest available cohort 
comprises the tenth wave; responses to the survey were taken in 2010. Given the evidence that 
the expansion of housing prices occurred after the second wave of the HRS, we concentrated our 
analyses on waves 3 to 10. This choice is based on the quality of data and is consistent with 
previous studies (Goda, 2011, Finklestein and McGarry, 2006). However, unlike previous 
studies, we do not limit our analysis to a specific age group because we are interested in the 
effect of a wealth shock on use of LTSS. Overall, the survey is rich in socio-economic variables 
that describe individuals and their households. They include demographics, health status, wealth 
(housing related and other), income and insurance converge.  
 
We were able to obtain restricted access to examine changes in housing wealth at the 
state and metropolitan level. The results show the same effects as when using the unrestricted 
                                                 
5 They might experience an indirect income effect if owners transferred part of the wealth effect by changing the 
individuals’ rent but we cannot observe that.   
6 AHEAD is an acronym for Assets and Health Dynamics among the Oldest Old.  
7 For more information about the HRS sample, see: http://hrsonline.isr.umich.edu/sitedocs/sampleresponse.pdf. 
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census region data on residence, largely because the housing bubble disintegrated most in 
specific census regions and the relative declines in housing prices were largely consistent within 
regions. Thus, focusing on regions provides sufficient variability to obtain a local average 
treatment effect (LATE).  Further, while housing prices were a relevant and statistically 
significant instrument for wealth among home owners, it is the disintegration of the housing 
bubble that allows us to identify unanticipated wealth changes. Crucially for our study, some 
earlier work argues that wealth shocks have different effects on LTSS utilization depending on 
the number of residents in the household (Bell and Rutherford, 2012).   
 
The analysis sample includes 172,572 observations and the dependent variables mostly refer to 
the external margin of long term care utilization. That is, a set of binary indicators that measure 
the use of nursing home, home health care, and informal care. For some variables, we examine 
the internal margin too when available (informal care).  Table A1 in the Appendix displays 
names of the variables and the descriptive statistics and sample size. The table shows that 1.8% 
of the sample lives in a nursing home and 6.2% received home health care in the past 12 months.  
Using additional information from the HRS we could measure informal care support by 
identifying individuals who received help with activities of daily living (ADL). About 10% of 
the sample receives informal care, and we could identify the number of monthly hours of 
informal care an individual received, estimated at 14.26 (0.45) which is consistent with Norton 
and Von Houtven (2004). The table summarizes the average net worth (net total assets), and net 
total housing assets. In addition, we report the descriptive statistics of the housing price index 
(HPI) employed for the period. This is a broad measure of the movement of single-family house 
prices. It serves as a timely, accurate indicator of house price trends at various geographic 
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levels. It also provides an analytical tool that is useful for estimating changes in the rates of 
mortgage defaults, prepayments and housing affordability in specific geographic areas. The HPI 
is a measure designed to capture changes in the value of single-family houses in the U.S. as a 
whole, in smaller areas. The HPI is published by the Federal Housing Finance Agency 
(FHFA) using data provided by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Table A1 contains information 
on demographic and health controls for the respondent as well as that of the spouse. Finally, 
means tests on the equality of characteristics between renters and home owners suggest no 
statistical significance differences on marital status and family composition, but some differences 
in age composition were observed (renters are more likely to be over 75 and owners are more 
likely to fall in the 65-75 age groups). 
Empirical Strategy. With these data from the HRS, we estimate an instrumental variable 
model to estimate the impact of variation in an individual’s wealth stemming from changes in 
housing prices on use of LTSS. Given that changes in housing prices did not affect individuals 
who were not home owners, we examine the estimated effects for those who were renting a 
property before and after 2007-8 (interpreted as one control group not affected by a decline on 
property prices) and compare those estimates to changes for individuals that owned property 
(OWN). This is a form of “placebo test”. In addition, we compare the changes in wealth of those 
who were already receiving LTSS to those who obtained such services after the downturn 
(POST).  Since we control for fixed effects for each region and each year, the effect of the 
economic change is identified. Additional robustness checks include analyses of specific 
subgroups of the population such as single people. We address the problem of the existence of 
within geographic-year correlation across observations, as well as serial correlation within 
provinces across time. 
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[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
A number of key features in the economic environment play a crucial role in our 
identification strategy.  First, the panel (a) in Figure 1 plots the trends in the population share 
without housing assets over time by age group. Overall the trends are suggestive of no overall 
change in the proportion of non-homeowners, with a slight increase towards 2008-10 for younger 
people. Thus, there appear to be parallel trends on homeownership. The second panel (b) in 
Figures 1 contains the evolution of housing prices as reported by FHFA and, as expected we find 
a comparable trend. However, such differences vary by age groups. Indeed, Figure 2 reports 
differences in trends for total assets by age group of those without housing assets, and Figures 3 
and 4 display the trends in total and housing assets by age group. Once again, trends in Figure 3 
indicate that there is a slight difference in the trends for the younger groups. However, 
individuals over the age of 65 show comparable trends irrespective of the age group, which is 
suggestive of an expansion in housing assets through 2006 that then exhibits a sharp decline in 
2008 and beyond. Similar and more homogeneous trends are observed form housing assets in 
Figure 4. Hence, we can conclude that changes in housing prices are indeed correlated with 
changes in individual’s assets.  
 
 
 
[Insert Figure 2 and 3 and 4 about here] 
 
Drawing on the variation in housing prices that is orthogonal to an individual’s choices, 
we define in what follows an instrumental variable strategy capturing the effect of house prices 
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as a source of variation in assets to examine the impact of housing wealth on decisions regarding 
LTSS. Our basic estimating equation is an instrumentals variables equation of the following 
form: 
 
𝑷(𝑌𝑖𝑡𝑔) = 𝜸𝒕 + 𝝁𝒈 + 𝑿𝒊𝒕𝒈 ∙ 𝜹 + 𝝋𝑨𝑺𝑺𝑬𝑻𝑺 𝒊𝒕̂ + 𝜺𝒊𝒕𝒈    (1) 
 
𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝒂𝒕 + 𝒃𝒈 + 𝒁𝒊𝒕𝒈 ∙ 𝝋 + 𝒄(𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒  𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑔𝑡) + 𝒖𝒊𝒕𝒈 
 
Where  𝑌𝑖𝑡𝑔 denotes LTSS (home health care, nursing home) use by an individual 𝑖 in a group 𝑔 
and year 𝑡; 𝛾𝑡 denotes a set of time dummies (survey waves), 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑔is a vector of covariates that 
act as controls (age, gender, married, health status) which are exogenous (especially time variant 
ones). Z is a vector of covariates that act as controls (age, gender, married, health and disability) 
and all-time constant variables between different locations are controlled for. We condition our 
estimates for individuals who own a home, where 𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖𝑡𝑔 is a dummy variable for whether the 
individual is an owner of a property and thus affected by the housing bubble burst.  Standard 
errors are clustered at either the census region or state level to account for potential correlation 
errors within regions and states8. We estimated different specifications using different dependent 
variables, namely use of home health care, use of informal care, and nursing home care at the 
external margin. We also consider a number of placebo tests and reduced forms of house prices 
to confirm that the first stage regressions are indeed suggestive of an experiment as described in 
the results section.  
 
                                                 
8 We can estimate the main effects using linear probability models, but estimates using nonlinear models such as 
2SRI (Terza et al 2008) deliver comparable estimates.   
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Preliminary evidence on use of LTSS: Figure 5 plots trends over time of use of home 
health care and nursing home care. Overall, we find hardly any change in rates of nursing home 
utilization. However, a sharp increase in the rate of home health care use is observable after 
2006. When the trends are stratified by age group in Figure 6, and we find that after 2006 there is 
a sharp increase in the utilization of home health care by individuals ages 75 and over (those 
most at risk for needing LTSS). This effect occurs alongside a reduction in the use of nursing 
home care for the same age group as shown in Figure 5. Figure 7 displays trends of nursing 
home care utilization across income groups that suggests that utilization has been higher among 
peoples 75 and over, but overall the trends are stable during the period examined. Finally, Figure 
8 displays trends in informal care for a shorter period where we can gather reliable data. Trends 
suggest a relative rise in the use of informal care that becomes stable in the middle of the decade 
of 2000’s at around 40-45%. However, all of our analyses focus on the extensive margins.  
 
[Insert Figure 5 and 6, 7 and 8 about here] 
 
 
4. Results 
 
Reduced forms. As a way to test for the validity of our instruments, we begin by 
reporting reduced form estimates including a time trend as a covariate and housing price indexes 
(Table 1). The estimates indicate that housing prices do indeed exert a positive effect on informal 
care, and a negative effect on the likelihood of using both home health and nursing home care.  
The effect of housing prices in turn suggests that the instrument is associated with the dependent 
variables. However, whether the effect survives the inclusion of controls is an empirical question 
resolved below.  
17 
 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
Validity of the instruments. Next, we examine the validity of instruments in predicting total 
housing assets.  We find that an expected a change in the index would change total wealth 
irrespectively of whether it refers to total assets or just housing wealth (Table 2). However, we 
also find that when we examine the period 1998-2010 for housing assets, the coefficient is three 
time larger. The F-tests of these regressions are always significantly larger than 10, and this is 
the case irrespective of the inclusion of controls. Table 3 shows placebo tests of the effects of 
house prices on wealth of non-home owners; the tests consistently find no effect on any of the 
different sub periods and the total sample.  
 
[Insert Table 2 and 3 about here] 
 
 
Use of LTSS. Next we examine the effect of wealth changes on the use of home health. We find 
evidence of a positive wealth effect on the likelihood of using home health that is robust to the 
inclusion of individual fixed effects (see Table 4). This is the case for both total assets and 
housing assets, and the coefficient indicates that one standard deviation change in wealth (total 
assets) increases the probability of home health care use by 0.25 percentage points. The effect on 
home health care use of one standard deviation change in assets is of 0.2 percentage points; this 
effect compares in percentage points to the effect of one standard deviation increase in the 
number of a person’s ADLs (which results in a 0.027 percentage point increase).  
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[Insert Table about here] 
 
Our results indicate that wealth exerts a positive effect on the use of informal care both at the 
intensive and extensive margins (Table 5). The intensive margin of informal care is measured by 
the monthly hours of help used by those who receive help with ADLs. The results are positive 
and significant for both measures of wealth: the coefficient estimates suggest that a one standard 
deviation change in total net assets and housing assets leads to increases of 3.2% and 4.3%, 
respectively, in the probability of informal care use. The effect on the intensive margin of a one 
standard deviation change in total (housing) assets increase informal care use by 8.36 (27.3) 
hours a month.  
 
Finally, we find no significant effect of total wealth and housing assets on the probability of 
using nursing home care (Table 6).  We posit that the informal care response is due to the 
possibility that nursing home use is reduced as wealth increases, thereby inducing more informal 
help. We recognize that our estimation results on nursing home use are mixed but there is some 
evidence of reduced use as wealth grows. We are cautious in our views of the nursing home 
impact because of potential power issues in the IV estimation and our limited definition of 
institutional care. 
 
 
 [Insert Tables 5 and 6 about here] 
Mechanisms. As a final analysis, we tested for the effect of a wealth shock on health and 
disability at old age. Overall, we find no evidence of any effect. Hence, the main mechanism 
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appears to be a direct effect of a change in the value of housing assets on the demand for LTSS, 
and specifically on a higher reliance on community care services, consistent with a stronger 
probability of ageing in place.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This article exploits the quasi-experimental variation in both the timing and strength of the 
housing price change (which we expect constitute unanticipated wealth shocks to families) on 
the use of LTSS in the United States. The latter is used in the context of an instrumental variable 
strategy drawing on both the effects on total and housing assets. Consistent with the study 
expectations, we find evidence that a wealth shock after the change in housing prices does 
change long term care choices for homeowners but not for renters. More specifically, changes in 
housing wealth affect use of home health and informal care both at the intensive and extensive 
margins. However, our causal LATE estimates indicate that such an exogenous change in wealth 
does not significantly influence nursing home care utilization. A more complete analysis would 
incorporate measurement of the use of assisted living arrangements that are likely to be more 
sensitive to wealth than is nursing home use. Unfortunately, information about assisted living 
arrangements were not available to us.  
 
Overall, we find that the increased use of home health care due to a positive wealth shock 
compares in size to the effect of a one standard deviation change in disability (ADLs). Further, 
we find a 3-4% increase in the probability of informal care use after an asset shock, which is 
consistent with the literature and suggestive of a preference for individuals to age in place 
(Costa-Font et al., 2009). We find causal evidence of effects of wealth changes for home owners 
20 
 
and no effect for renters, thereby strengthening our causal inference about the impact of wealth 
on LTSS demand.  
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Tables and Figures 
 
Figure 1.  Total Assets of Elderly American Households and the Evolution of different 
house prices (FHFA Index) 
 
a) Wealth of Elderly Americans 
 
Source: Health and Retirement Study, waves 1 -10.  
 
 
a) Average House prices 
 
 
Source: FHFA, 2013.  
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Figure 2. Population without Housing Assets (Not Affected House Prices) 
 
Source: Health and Retirement Study, waves 2 -10.  
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Figure 3. Evolution of Total Assets by age groups 
 
Source: Health and Retirement Study, waves 2 -10.  
 
Figure 4. Evolution of Total Housing Assets by age groups 
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Figure 5.  Use of LTSS – Home health care (HH) and Nursing Home (NH)  
 
Source: Health and Retirement Study, waves 3 -10.  
 
 
 
Figure 6 Use of LTSS - User of Home Health Care by Age group 
 
Source: Health and Retirement Study, waves 3 -10.  
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Figure 7 Use of LTSS - Individuals residing in nursing home by Age group 
 
 
 
Source: Health and Retirement Study, waves 3 -10.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Informal Care Trends (HRS) 
 
 
Source: Health and Retirement Study, waves 3 -9. 
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Table 1. Reduced forms on informal care, home health care and nursing home 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Informal 
Care 
Home Health 
Care r 
Living Nursing 
Home 
    
Housing Price 0.000215** -4.72e-05*** -4.57e-05*** 
 (0.000105) (1.53e-05) (1.01e-05) 
Trend 0.0211*** 0.00530*** 0.00130*** 
 (0.00214) (0.000263) (0.000213) 
Constant 0.240*** 0.0499*** 0.0222*** 
 (0.0201) (0.00255) (0.00195) 
    
Observations 12,468 156,642 128,657 
R-squared 0.008 0.003 0.000 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
Table 2. House Price effects on Total and Housing Assets (in logs) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Total Assets Total Assets Housing 
Assets 
Housing 
Assets 
VARIABLES     
     
Housing Price 0.0016*** 0.0011*** 0.0024*** 0.0020*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Controls No Yes No Yes 
Constant 10.9604*** 11.7227*** 8.5579*** 10.7026*** 
 (0.027) (0.049) (0.043) (0.090) 
     
Observations 153,323 103,387 156,809 104,439 
F-Test 78.52 633.96 72.11 639.16 
R-squared 0.001 0.018 0.001 0.018 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Controls: age, gender, health and disability, place of birth, marital status, household size, income, education, 
ethnicity, time effects. 
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Table 3 Placebo Effects (Effect of House price change on Assets of Non-Property Owners)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Total Assets 
(logs) 
Housing 
Assets (logs) 
Total Assets 
(logs) 
Housing 
Assets (logs) 
 [1992-10] [2006-10] [1992-10] [2006-10] 
Housing Price -0.000455 -0.00144 -0.00221 -0.00154 
 (0.00151) (0.00170) (0.00215) (0.00442) 
Constant 7.810*** 7.935*** -1.738** -7.294*** 
 (0.240) (0.298) (0.870) (2.802) 
     
Location - FE No No Yes Yes 
Observations 13,018 2,487 5,456 853 
R-squared 0.001 0.001 0.262 0.297 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Controls: age, gender, health and disability, place of birth, marital status, household size, income, education, 
ethnicity, time effects. 
 
 
 
Table 4. Assets Effects on Home health care use. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES IV (Total 
Assets) 
IV (Housing 
Assets) 
IV (Total 
Assets) FE 
IV (Housing 
Assets) FE 
     
Total Assets (logs) 0.0738**  0.0720**  
 (0.0323)  (0.0287)  
Housing Assets (logs)  0.115  0.0867** 
  (0.0884)  (0.0395) 
Constant -0.582*** -0.553** -0.721*** -0.881*** 
 (0.166) (0.268) (0.209) (0.324) 
     
Trends Linear Linear Linear Linear 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual  FE No No Yes Yes 
Observations 137,859 140,952 137,859 140,952 
Number of hhidpn   28,448 28,647 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Controls: age, gender, health and disability, place of birth, marital status, household size, income, education, 
ethnicity, time effects. 
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Table 5.  Effect of Assets on Informal Care  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Extensive 
Margin 
OLS IV IV-owners OLS IV IV-owners 
       
Total Assets 
(logs) 
0.214*** 0.214*** 0.282***    
 (0.0637) (0.0637) (0.0764)    
Total Housing 
Assets (logs) 
   -0.00613*** 0.0788*** 0.231*** 
    (0.00109) (0.0289) (0.0655) 
Constant -2.270*** -2.270*** -3.004*** 0.170*** -0.487** -2.331*** 
 (0.713) (0.713) (0.855) (0.0147) (0.224) (0.704) 
       
Observations 11,768 11,768 7,973 11,725 11,725 7,930 
R-squared 0.163 0.163 0.114 0.164  0.028 
Intensive Margin 
       
lhatota 37.11** 37.11** 36.88**    
 (18.13) (18.13) (17.10)    
lhatoth    -0.160 13.97* 29.62** 
    (0.316) (7.462) (14.02) 
Constant -402.5** -402.5** -394.4** 14.10*** -96.19* -300.3** 
 (202.9) (202.9) (191.5) (4.381) (58.39) (151.0) 
       
Observations 10,585 10,585 7,317 10,542 10,542 7,274 
R-squared 0.045 0.045 0.040 0.045  0.010 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Controls: age, gender, health and disability, place of birth, marital status, household size, income, education, 
ethnicity, time effects. 
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Table 6.  Effect of Assets on Nursing Home Care  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES IV 
(Total 
Assets) 
IV 
(ADL>0) 
IV 
(Medicare=0) 
IV 
(Housing 
Assets 
Medicare=0) 
IV-FE IV-FE 
(Housing 
Assets) 
IV-FE 
(Medicare=0) 
        
Total Assets 
(logs) 
-0.00622  -0.00589  -0.00730  -0.00751 
 (0.0109)  (0.00383)  (0.00471)  (0.00474) 
Housing 
Assets 
(logs) 
 -0.0652  -0.00440  -0.00700  
  (0.172)  (0.00284)  (0.0158)  
Trends Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear Quadratic 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.0138 0.105 0.0362 0.0299 0.0462 -0.193 0.0489 
 (0.0571) (0.614) (0.0293) (0.0251) (0.0612) (0.279) (0.0616) 
        
Observations 103,131 13,502 87,545 87,324 91,222 113,644 91,046 
R-squared 0.026       
Note: Standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Controls: age, gender, health and disability, place of birth, marital status, household size, income, education, 
ethnicity, time effects. 
 
 
 
Table 7.  Effect of Assets on Disability and Health (2SRI-Probit) 
VARIABLES ADL Obesity CESD ADL Obesity CESD 
 2006-2010 1998-2010 
       
Housing Assets 
(logs) 
0.0590 -0.225** 0.275 0.139 -0.287 0.977 
 (0.0619) (0.112) (0.287) (0.106) (0.184) (0.774) 
Controls       
Constant 0.784*** 0.424*** 4.098*** 0.629*** 0.329*** 2.775*** 
 (0.0918) (0.141) (0.332) (0.0444) (0.0705) (0.255) 
       
Observations 14,506 14,509 13,779 78,061 78,104 73,453 
R-squared       
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Controls: age, gender, health and disability, place of birth, marital status, household size, income, education, 
ethnicity, time effects. 
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Appendix 
 
 
Table A1. Descriptive Statistics 
 N Mean 
(s.e) 
Definition 
Dependent Variables 
rnhmliv 126652 0.0180 Respondent lives in Nursing Home 
Informal  170075 0.0999 Respondent received informal care – extensive margin 
Informalhours 34048 14.260 
(0.456) 
Respondent monthly hours of informal care – intensive 
margin 
rhomcar 155694 0.0620 Respondent receives home health is last 12 months 
Assets and House Prices 
hpriceindex 156997 152.9 
(0.1) 
FHFA Index- Census Divisions- MSA 
hatota 157059 363,156 
(3149) 
Total household Assets 
hatoth 157059 110,601 
(969) 
Total household housing Assets 
Demographic Controls  
married 298550 0.3479 Respondent is married 
gender 298541 0.4370 Respondent is Male 
hchild 170149 3.1986 
(0.005) 
Number of ever born children  
ragey_b 157057 65.92 
(0.028) 
Respondents age 
sagey_b 109043 63.70 
(0.03) 
Spouse’s age 
Respondents and Spouse Health and Disability 
Sadl2more 298550 0.650 Spouse has 2 ADL’s or more 
adl2more 298550 0.4346 Respondents has 2 ADL’s or more 
rcesd 145017 1.3254 
(0.005) 
Respondents Mental Health (CESD score) 
scesd 97146 1.0989 
(0.005) 
Spouse Mental Health (CESD score_ 
rbmi 154994 27.12 
(0.014) 
Respondent Body Mass Index (BMI) 
sbmi 104482 27.31 
(0.016) 
Spouse Body Mass Index (BMI) 
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Figure A2. Housing Assets (amount and %) and Net Worth of Americans 
 
 
 
Source: US Census Bureau, 2015.  
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